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This thesis investigates the determinant factors concerning pricing of loans in 
LBOs, using a sample of 13,315 syndicated loans closed from 2000 to 2013. The 
results seem to indicate that spreads and pricing processes differ significantly in 
market-based versus bank-based financial systems as well as in the U.S. versus 
W.E. In the pre-crisis period, LBO loans extended to market-based borrowers face 
higher spreads compared to bank-based countries. During the crisis-period, 
borrowers from common law legal systems face higher spreads for loans in LBOs. 
The regression results presented for LBO loans extended to U.S. versus W.E. 
borrowers demonstrate that those in the U.S. face higher spreads. These results 
are in line with Carey and Nini (2007). A robust convex relationship between 
spread and maturity is found for loans in LBOs. Lastly, acquired firms with 
higher cash flow potential (market-to-book ratio) and asset tangibility (fixed asset 
to total assets) experience a lower spread. Furthermore, firms’ characteristics, 
namely book leverage, do not affect the pricing of loans in LBOs, opposed to 
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A leveraged buyout (LBO) is an acquisition of a company by a specialized 
investment firm using a significant amount of borrowed funds (debt financing) 
and a small portion of equity1. The large investment in debt has advantages and 
disadvantages that can affect the pricing of LBO loans. 
This thesis investigates the determinant factors concerning pricing of loans in 
LBOs, using a sample of 2,671 deals which correspond to 13,315 syndicated loans 
closed during the 2000-2013 period. The study aims to discover the differences in 
loan pricing, namely between financial systems (market-based versus bank-
based), the location of the borrower (U.S. versus W.E.), the legal systems 
implemented on the borrower country (common law versus civil law), the effect 
of the pre-crisis and crisis period and the term structure of loan spreads. 
Several studies have investigated loan pricing, specifically for corporate loans 
and bonds. However, only two empirical papers have tried to investigate the 
determinants of syndicated loan spreads in LBOs. Ivashina and Kovner (2011) 
use a sample of 1,590 loans closed between 1993 and 2005 in the U.S. to study the 
impact of private equity firms’ bank relationships on the terms of their 
syndicated loans. Colla et al. (2012) study the determinants of both capital 
structure and debt pricing, using a sample of 1,006 tranches closed between 1997 
and 2008. Since the empirical literature of the determinants that affect the pricing 
processes of an LBO loans is scant, this thesis aims to extend current knowledge 
by investigating if pricing models use similar determinants for project finance 
loans and syndicated loans. To extend the literature on debt pricing, this thesis 
                                                 
1 Definition of LBO is based on the paper by Kaplan et al. (2009). 
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aims to answer the following question: Are loans in LBOs influenced by common 
pricing determinants and to what extent are they similar to other syndicated loans? 
The main goal of a financial system is to raise funds from investors and 
exchange them between investors and borrowers through regulated markets and 
intermediaries.2 The types of financial system, bank-based versus market-based, 
play an important role because of the benefits and disadvantages of the financing 
decision and consequently, influence LBO loan spreads. Beck and Levine (2002) 
show that banks are more effective than the market in financing new projects. 
However, Chakraborty and Ray (2006) argue that the ability of a firm to raise 
external funds and grow is affected by the organization of financial activities. 
Allen and Gale (1999) show that the legal system plays an important role, 
controlling the restrictions used on securities and the type of contracts. La Porta 
et al. (1998) find that legal protections of investors differ across countries 
(common law versus civil-law). According to Gatti et al. (2013), loans for projects 
in countries with stronger creditor rights, lower political and economic risks have 
lower spreads. Ergungor (2008) shows that legal system is also correlated with 
economic growth. The evidence on the type of financial systems raises a second 
question: Are LBO loan spreads and pricing processes significantly different between 
market-based and bank-based financial systems? 
The LBO loan market is not globally integrated and the spreads on syndicated 
loans to LBOs are different across the United States (U.S.) and Western Europe 
(W.E.). Although the crisis had an impact on credit spreads across the U.S. and 
W.E., the biggest difference is due to the type of financial systems used to finance 
LBO transactions and the law legal system. Carey and Nini (2007) show evidence 
that syndicated loan credit spreads are significantly smaller in Europe than in the 
U.S. Additionally, according to Colla et al. (2012) between 1997 and 2009, a major 
part of buyout deals have occurred in the U.S. and the rest of them have been 
                                                 
2 Definition of financial system is based on the papers by Boot and Thakor (1997) and Chakraborty et al. (2006). 
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placed in the U.K. This difference on spreads related to borrowers’ location raises 
another question: Are LBO loan spreads arranged to U.S. borrowers significantly 
higher than those of LBO loan spreads arranged to W.E. borrowers? 
The 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt 
crisis deteriorated the credit market conditions and investors lost confidence in 
structured finance credit ratings. Therefore, collaterized loan obligations (CLO) 
and leveraged buyout loans have dissipated, and interest rates on debt related to 
buyouts increased significantly 3 . According to Marques et al. (2015), credit 
spreads for other types of syndicated loans - project finance loans - have 
significantly increased as a consequence of the financial crisis. This increase on 
spreads raises an additional question: After controlling for macroeconomic conditions 
and loan characteristics, did the 2007/2008 financial crisis have a significant impact on 
LBO loan spreads? 
Finally, the term structure of spreads for syndicated loans is yet to be fully 
understood since the results presented in previous studies do not reach the same 
conclusions. From syndicated loans to LBOs, Ivashina and Kovner (2011) and 
Colla et al. (2012) identify a positive relationship between spread and maturity. 
Concerning corporate loans, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Caselli and 
Gatti (2005) conclude that project finance loan pricing is not a positive function 
of maturity. However, they discover a significantly negative relationship 
between spread and maturity. This negative relationship is explained by the fact 
that structured financing loans are characterized by longer maturities and make 
use of a special purpose vehicle (SPV). Nevertheless, Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) 
and Marques et al. (2015) show a robust-convex relationship on the term 
structure of spreads. These divergent results lead us to the final question: After 
controlling for microeconomic and macroeconomic pricing factors, is the term structure 
of spreads in LBO loans different from that of corporate financing loans? 
                                                 
3 Based on the papers by Kaplan et al. (2009) and Benmelech et al. (2009). 
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The results presented by this thesis show that loans in LBOs closed in market-
based and bank-based financial systems are influenced differently by common 
pricing factors. Moreover, even loans extended to U.S. and W.E. borrowers have 
different pricing processes. During the pre-crisis period, loans in LBOs extended 
to borrowers in market-based financial systems face higher spreads (13.27 bps) 
than those in bank-based financial systems. During the crisis period, only loans 
extended to borrowers in common law legal systems face higher spreads (41.12 
bps). Loans extended to U.S. borrowers are associated with 45.79 bps higher 
spreads than loans arranged to W.E. borrowers.  
This thesis contributes to the literature on pricing processes of LBO loans. The 
investigation focuses on pricing processes of loans to LBO and if they differ on 
the borrower location, market-based financial system versus bank-based financial 
system. The study also contributes to corporate finance and financial 
intermediation literature, since spreads on LBOs are different across the U.S. and 
W.E. Furthermore, the study contributes to the analysis of the impact by the 
2007/2008 crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis on the spread 
and pricing processes. Since the term structure of spreads remains a puzzle, we 
contribute with a model of the term structure of spreads for LBOs loans, 
controlling for different financial systems and time periods. Lastly, the influence 
by target firm characteristics on LBO loan spreads is also analyzed. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a review on the literature 
of LBO loans. Section 3 presents the research questions. Section 4 describes the 
data and sample selection, along with the descriptive and preliminary analysis 
to the financial characteristics on syndicated loans in LBOs. Section 5 describes 
the methodology and the model used to answer the research questions. In section 
6 the results are presented and analyzed. Section 7 provides an analysis to the 
impact of acquired firms’ characteristics on spreads and pricing processes. 
Section 8 presents the principal conclusions of this study. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 What is a LBO? 
Structured finance plays an important role in the financial business, offering 
complex financing needs for companies [Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. These complex 
financing structures allow the financing of assets and business when 
conventional financing products are unavailable. According to Caselli and Gatti 
(2005), asset securitization, project finance, structured lease and acquisition 
finance activities, supported by a strong debt component, are the formats of 
structured finance. Concerning the leveraged acquisition, the most important 
financial instrument used is the leveraged buyout (LBO). 
According to previous studies [Kaplan et al. (2009)], a LBO is an acquisition of 
a company by a specialized investment firm using a significant amount of 
borrowed funds (outside debt financing) and a small portion of equity.  
In a traditional LBO, contrary to what happens in a traditional firm, debt 
comprises 60% to 70% of the financing structure; i.e., they use highly levered 
capital structures [Rosenbaum et al. (2009)]. During the debt structuring of a LBO 
transaction, there are two main financing characteristics. First, the high level of 
debt of the special purpose vehicle firm which is settled only for the transaction. 
Second, debt financing is obtained in multiple debt tranches that differ in terms 
of lender type: banks, institutional investors and arm’s length financing [Colla et 
al. (2012)]. These financing sources are called the financial intermediaries and can 
create value for the LBO firm. For example, repeated relationships between the 
leveraged firm and the bank leads to the achievement of a large amount of 
leverage with better terms.  
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In a typical leveraged buyout structure, the acquirer firm (LBO firm) remains 
with a higher debt ratio compared with the level of equity/debt before the 
acquisition. The choice of the target firm is related with the increase of the 
potential value for the acquirer firm, in restructuring or breaking up the target. 
Figure 1 demonstrates a LBO financial restructuring and the respective stages:  
 
Figure 1  –  LBO Scheme 
 
Source: Caselli, S., and S. Gatti, 2005. Structured Finance: Techniques, Products and Market, 
Springer Berlin 
 
(1) The new company or special purpose vehicle is used for the transfer of 
ownership since it is the new company which will make the acquisition of the 
target firm. (2) The new company receives a large amount of capital (debt 
infusion) raised through lenders (pool of banks and financial intermediaries). 
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This debt infusion is relocated to the acquirer firm and is transformed into a cash 
flow source to repay the assumed liabilities. (3) The new company acquires the 
target’s shares and the shareholders of the target firm are payed. (4) The acquirer 
firm makes an equity investment in the new company jointly with the financial 
investors [Caselli and Gatti (2005)]. According to Nikoskelainen et al. (2007), LBO 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as debt, ownership of equity and the 
active presence of investor, increase the firm value, reduce the agency costs and 
improve the efficiency of the operating performance of the firm. 
With the substitution of equity by debt in the LBOs, studies show large gains 
in operating performance, such as the creation of value with the improvement in 
cash flows and interest tax shield benefits. Additionally, reduced agency costs 
and operational improvements of firms are identified due to the discipline effect 
of debt and better aligned management incentives [Liu (2014) and Guo et al. 
(2011)]. The improvement in cash flows is the result of the reduction of available 
cash flow and consequently lesser agency costs of free cash flow. Tax benefits are 
the outcome of the interest payments since interest is tax deductible to the 
corporation, therefore leverage can provide a valuable tax shield [Jensen (1986) 
and Axelson et al. (2007)]. The mitigation of the agency conflicts is related to the 
lender’s monitoring of manager’s behavior [Liu (2014)] and with the reduced 
costs of processing and acquiring information about firms and their managers 
through financial intermediaries [Chakraborty et al. (2006)]. Regarding the 
incentives of the management, as Jensen (1986) reveals, issuing large amounts of 
debt is an effective motivating force for managers to reach a more efficient 
corporation since the risk caused by failure of debt service payments is higher.  
Although LBOs provide greater advantages for the target firm there are also 
some disadvantages. Cumming and Zambelli (2010) allege that LBO is associated 
with a negative impact on the target firm and the possibility of conflicts of interest 
within managers. Additionally, LBOs turn the acquired company weaker and 
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eradicate jobs. Ivashina and Kovner (2011) argue that the benefit of private equity 
investors also affect the employees with the deterioration of jobs and wage cuts. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) show evidence that private equity investors profit 
from circumstances in market timings, tax benefits and superior information. 
Additionally, Damodaran (2008) demonstrates that the use of debt has three 
disadvantages: (i) a possibility of bankruptcy costs; (ii) agency costs; and (iii) loss 
of future financing possibilities. Concerning the bankruptcy costs, with the 
increase of debt level the probability of failure in debt payments increases in the 
same proportion. Furthermore, these bankruptcy costs have legal fees and court 
costs which can affect the value of the assets of a bankrupt firm and may cause 
financial stress. The agency costs result from the creation of covenants and 
monitoring costs from the different and competing interests of equity investors 
and lenders in the firm. Regarding the loss of future financing flexibilities, with 
the increase of debt level the firm can be incapable to make future investments 
because of the debt payments of loans. 
According to Ivashina and Kovner (2011), a stronger bank relationship with a 
lead bank and LBO firms is related with lower loan spreads. In a loan contract, 
there is an essential element named loan covenant. Colla et al. (2012) show that 
the inclusion of covenants significantly decreases spreads at the loan tranche 
level. Loan covenants have an implication on the reduced asymmetric 
information since bank loan covenants can prevent bankruptcy due to financial 
flexibility. These covenants can be reduced with repeated bank lending 
relationships once that better-informed banks can worry less about the potential 
conflicts of interest in a LBO [Ivashina et al. (2011)]. Demiroglu et al. (2010) show 
that tighter covenants serve to limit moral hazard problems but also makes it 
possible for banks to impose contingent control rights to reduce risk shifting. 
The financing debt used in a LBO is gathered through the issue of different 
types of loans, securities and other instruments [Rosenbaum et al. (2009)]. LBOs 
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are usually included in the high leveraged transactions due to the high leverage 
borrowed and the debt components of the capital structure. These components 
are usually deemed non-investment grade or rated as “Ba1 4 ” and “BB+ 5 ” 
[Angbazo et al. (1998) and Rosenbaum et al. (2009)]. The rating evaluates the 
capacity of the borrower to repay interest on time, as promised. In the U.S., a 
major percentage of the LBO transactions were financed with syndicated loans 
[Ivashina et al. (2011)].  
According to Maskara (2010), syndicated loans have a relationship-based bank 
financing, as well as characteristics such as bond financing. The syndicated loan 
is “tranched” into heterogeneous components, distributed across lenders with 
different risk aversion (e.g., liquidity characteristics or different seniority) and 
sometimes sold at different prices in the capital market. The multiple tranches 
have a lower credit spread and the same credit risk as a stand-alone loan tranche 
with similar loan characteristics.  
Colla et al. (2012) find that tranche spreads can be explained by the same 
factors as corporate bond yields, which means spreads increase with equity 
volatility and with the cost of debt. 
2.2 The Financial System and Investor’s Protection 
According to several authors 6 , the main goal of a financial system is to 
approach and assemble funds from investors and exchange these funds between 
investors and borrowers through regulated markets and intermediaries. The 
types of financial system, bank-based versus market-based, play an important 
role due to the benefits and disadvantages of each financing decision, and thus 
                                                 
4 Moody’s Investor Service 
5 Standard and Poor’s 
6 Boot and Thakor (1997) and Chakraborty et al. (2006). 
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may impact significantly the leverage level of a LBO and, consequently, the cost 
of debt. 
Chakraborty and Ray (2006) show that in corporate finance the ability of a firm 
to raise external funds and to grow through corporate governance is affected by 
the organization of financial activities. Boot and Thakor (1997) describe the roles 
of banks and financial markets and assume that “agents within a bank can 
cooperate and coordinate their actions, whereas agents in a market compete”. In 
a market-based financial system, the transaction or a deal is made without a 
relationship between the lender and the borrower and each part is not monitored 
nor pressured. On the other hand, banks are more involved in the project 
selection, identifying promising entrepreneurs and monitoring firms 
[Chakraborty et al. (2006)]. 
Beck and Levine (2002) show that banks are more effective than the market in 
financing new projects that require high leverage since banks can bind to 
additional funding, if necessary, during the development of the project. 
Additionally, market-based reveal more information in public markets about the 
firm which can affect public stock prices during the acquisition of the LBO. 
In financial systems, there is an extremely important component, the legal 
system. Allen and Gale (1999) show that the law plays an important role given 
that it controls the restrictions used on securities, the type of contracts and which 
governance mechanism is more suitable for the firm. Legal rules protect investors 
against expropriation and also protect shareholders. La Porta et al. (1997) argue 
that countries with better legal protections can enable higher external finance 
with better terms, valued at higher amounts, and broader capital markets. 
Furthermore, smaller debt and equity markets are related with countries which 
have lower investor protections.  
La Porta et al. (1998) further on research legal protections of investors across 
49 countries. Laws globally differ across the countries, which means countries 
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with common law tradition (English law) protect investors more than the 
countries with civil law (derives from Roman law). Common law countries give 
stronger protections for shareholders and creditors. On the other hand, investors 
in civil law countries have the weakest legal rights.  
Colla et al. (2012) suggest that bond markets play an important role in the 
capital structure of LBOs and consequently the type of the financial system. 
These suggestions are related with the discovery that the deals in common law 
countries are concentrated in higher junior leverage and lower senior leverage.  
Foley and Greenwood (2010) experiment at a country level the relationship 
between ownership concentration and investor protection. Their results indicate 
that countries with weaker investor protection have a higher ownership 
concentration. As a consequence, firms use more external finance (debt) and 
grow less because of the concentrated ownership: blockholders do not issue 
equity. 
According to Gatti et al. (2013), loans for projects in countries with stronger 
creditor rights, lower political and economic risks have lower spreads. Esty and 
Megginson (2003) claim that lenders create smaller and concentrated syndicates 
to enable monitoring and low cost contracting, when the country has strong 
creditor rights and legal enforcement. 
The legal system is also correlated with economic growth. Ergungor (2008) 
shows that flexible judicial environments are correlated with well-developed 
countries and economic growth since market-based has an established and 
developed stock market. Consequently, entrepreneurs will invest more instead 




2.3 Differences in spreads between the U.S. and W.E 
Several authors7 have showed that the LBO loan market is still a recent market 
which has suffered a few changes since the recent economic crisis. Therefore, the 
market is not globally integrated and the spreads on syndicated loans to LBOs 
are different across the United States (U.S.) and Western Europe (W.E.). 
Considering W.E., the U.K. is the most developed buyout market. 
Although the crisis had an impact on credit spreads across the U.S. and W.E., 
the biggest difference is due to the type of financial systems used to finance LBO 
transactions. 
Carey and Nini (2007) show evidence that syndicated loan credit spreads are 
significantly smaller in Europe than in the U.S. The location of the borrower’s 
and lender’s activity has some impact in debt pricing. Transactions in syndicated 
loans are normally centered in London, New York and Hong Kong, which lead 
to several home bias. Carey and Nini (2007) find a relationship between borrower 
and lender domicile and the market location concerning the pricing differences. 
According to Ergungor et al. (2004), countries with common law are market-
based and countries with civil law are bank-based financial systems. Common 
law countries are more effective than civil law countries since they have more 
flexibility in interpreting and creating new rules. Consequently, banks emerge in 
countries with civil law as a solution to enforce contracts. In addition, common 
law countries have more creditor and shareholder protection laws which enables 
the development of financial markets.  
Considering the type of the financial system, the United Kingdom (U.K.) is a 
common law country like the U.S., both having a market-based financial system. 
                                                 
7 Rosenbaum et al. (2009) and Shivdasani and Wang (2011). 
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On the other hand, most of the countries is Western Europe are civil law countries 
and have bank-based financial system. 
 Wright et al. (2006) show that the U.K. had an exponential growth due to the 
investment of U.S. private equity firms in European buyout markets. A major 
part of the firms in the U.K. and Europe are family-owned with aging firms 
which can toughen the entry of hedge funds for buyout deals. Furthermore, U.K. 
managers are inclined to be more risk lovers than in W.E. for buyout deals and 
the infrastructure for doing buyouts differs across countries in Europe. For 
example, the U.K. has more developed private equity and debt markets and more 
favorable legal and tax backgrounds. Relatively to the size of the LBOs, higher 
buyouts have a greater performance and increased investor returns due to the 
bankruptcy risk [Nikoskelainen et al. (2007)]. Smaller LBOs have a higher risk of 
bankruptcy which is also related with the difficulty of hedge funds in Europe. 
According to Colla et al. (2012), between 1997 and 2009, a major part of buyout 
deals occurred in the U.S. and the rest of them have been placed in the U.K. 
Moreover, deals in common law countries rely on higher junior and lower senior 
leverage with a significant difference in spreads. Spreads in common law 
countries are 32 to 58 bps higher than in civil law countries. 
2.4 The Latest Financial Crisis 
According to Shivdasani and Wang (2011), a leveraged buyout boom occured 
between 2004 and 2007, which also coincided with an exponential growth in 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other forms of securitization. This 
growth is related with important developments in capital market conditions, 
investor landscape and structured credit markets [Rosenbaum et al. (2009)]. 
During this LBO boom, banks used to finance LBO loans with collateralized loan 
 14 
obligations (CLO) which are CDOs backed by loans. CLOs have financed 
globally private equity firms in leveraged buyouts [Benmelech and Dlugosz 
(2009)]. 
During this period, some of the LBO transactions were driven by the 
accessibility of debt financing, which implied low returns since managers were 
not motivated by the potential of operating and governance developments 
[Kaplan and Strömberg (2009)]. 
Banks used to finance LBO loans with CDOs due to easier credit terms and 
lower costs for its borrowers with cheaper credit and looser covenant protections 
[Shivdasani et al. (2011)]. However, the 2007-2008 financial crisis has deteriorated 
the credit market conditions and investors lost confidence in structured finance 
credit ratings. Consequently, CLOs and LBOs dissipated, and interest rates on 
debt related to buyouts increased significantly [Kaplan et al. (2009) and 
Benmelech et al. (2009)]. According to Marques et al. (2015), credit spreads for 
other type of syndicated loans - project finance loans - significantly increase as 
consequence of the financial crisis.  
2.5 Different terms for divergent loans 
During the past years, project finance (PF) has been associated with successful 
financial and operating transactions loans but with differences compared with 
other loans. PF is a structured finance defined by the creation of a legally 
independent vehicle company, a special purpose vehicle (SPV), to achieve its 
financing objectives [Gatti et al. (2013)]. According to Caselli and Gatti (2005), 
SPVs are a project company made for a particular purpose which is financially 
and legally independent from the sponsors. Since PF loans create a SPVs, 
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similarly to LBO loans, and are related with high leverage, the determinants that 
affect PF loans can be used to explain the pricing processes for LBO loans. 
According to Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), PF loans differ from other 
loans (non-project finance) in that they have longer maturities, more 
participating banks, and lesser loan covenants. Ivashina and Kovner (2011) 
defend that a stronger bank relationship between the LBO firms and the lead 
bank is related with lower loan spreads. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) 
determine that PF loans have lower credit spreads compared to non-PF loans due 
to reduced agency costs. Colla et al. (2012) examine spreads at the tranche level 
for LBOs and find that extended maturities tranches are associated with higher 
spreads. On the other hand, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Gatti et al. 
(2013) conclude that the connection between spread and maturity have a 
significantly negative relationship for project finance loans. Several authors do 
not agree with this negative relationship between maturity and spreads. As 
reported by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), the term structure of credit spreads for 
project finance is humped-shaped, which is due to essential characteristics of PF 
structures, such as high leverage and short-term liquidity as a consequence of the 
risk of longer maturity. Since loan repayment relies mostly on the cash-flow of 
the acquired firm, the short-term liquidity represents a risk. Consequently, the 
spreads are higher in shorter-term maturities. However, in longer maturities the 
cash-flow of the acquired firm is higher and the liquidity risk is smaller. Thus, 
the loan spreads are lower. Marques et al. (2015) also conclude that PF loans have 





2.6 Pricing Determinants 
In this section, the literature on the pricing of loans is reviewed. 
Barclay and Smith (1995) provide evidence that regulated firms issue more 
long-term debt since regulation controls the underinvestment problem. A strong 
connotation between firm size and debt maturity is also identified since big firms 
issue more long-term debt than small firms. Additionally, a reliable positive 
relationship between a firm financial (S&P) bond rating and debt maturity is 
found. 
Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) find an important determinant of the pricing of 
loans, the interest rates. Loan spreads are measured over base rates of different 
maturities and inflations expectations, which can have a significant impact on the 
pricing rate of debt. Campbell and Taksler (2003) consider the equity volatility as 
an important determinant of corporate bond yield spreads and also find that 
yield spreads and credit rating can be explained by volatility, especially for firms 
with a high ratio of long-term debt. 
Colla et al. (2012) investigation focuses on a sample of 238 LBOs closed 
between 1997 and 2008, of which 1,006 individual debt tranches are included. 
Spreads are tested at tranche level and proved that they increase with maturity. 
In addition, macroeconomic factors can be used to explain tranche spreads since 
spreads increase with equity volatility and credit spreads. Furthermore, the 
investigation proves that market conditions positively affect the cost of LBO debt; 
longer maturity tranches have higher spreads; loan covenants decrease 
significantly spreads and the size of the loan is not significant. 
Ivashina and Kovner (2011) use a sample of 1,590 LBO loans with detailed loan 
information for each sponsor/borrower between 1993 and 2005. The fact that 
bank relationships are a competitive advantage is found. Stronger bank 
relationships are associated with a lower cost of lending (covenants) and better 
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loan terms since the asymmetric information problem is reduced. LBO firms 
improve value since banks lower the spreads when there are potential cross-
selling prospects. 
Demiroglu and James (2010) investigate the role of private equity group 
reputation in LBO financing using a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs in the 
US between 1997 and 2007. Private equity group invest more in LBO markets 
when lending requirements in the credit markets are sloppy and credit risk 
spreads are minor. Additionally, reputable private equity group (1) pay limited 
institutional and bank loan spreads; (2) have longer maturities; and (3) depend 
more on institutional loans. 
Previous researchers8 focus their investigation on term structure spreads for 
project finance (PF) loans. 
Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) analyze the pricing of the cross section of loans 
and bonds, focusing on the relationship of spread-maturity. This relationship in 
PF is “humped-shaped” due to the short-term liquidity. Marques et al. (2015) also 
prove that PF term structure of spreads is “humped-shaped” as opposed to 
investment-grade and speculative-grade bonds, which are linearly positive.  
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) compare a sample of 4,956 PF loans with 
samples of non-PF loans closed in international capital markets between 1980 and 
1999. Their evidence proves that PF loans have longer maturity, more detailed 
loan covenants, transparent cash-flows in riskier countries (more than average), 
and lower loan size than non-PF loans. In addition, Corielli et al. (2010) evidence 
that in PF, lenders rely on the network of nonfinancial contracts to control agency 
costs and improve risk management. 
Gatti et al. (2013) use a sample of 4,122 PF loans between 1991 and 2005 and 
prove that prestigious arranging banks allow larger leveraged loans and create 
economic value by reducing loan spreads. Esty and Megginson (2003) use a 
                                                 
8 Based on Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Marques et al. (2015). 
 18 
sample of 495 loan tranches in 61 different countries completed between 1986 and 
2000. A high concentration between syndicate structure and legal risk is 
identified. 
Marques et al. (2015) investigate which factors determine the pricing of PF 
loans and corporate bonds using a sample of a cross-section of 24,435 Western 
European loans and bond issues. This sample incorporates the issues closed 
during the 2000-2011 period. PF loans have a robust hump-shaped relationship 








3. Hypothesis development 
In this section, the hypothesis related to the research question are presented 
and explained. 
The literature review shows that various studies demonstrate that numerous 
determinants affect LBO loan spreads. The main motivation of the investigation 
on the determinants is related to the fact that the available literature is scant and 
to investigate if the determinants that affect other loan spreads are the same for 
loans to LBO. This thesis aims to cover the literature on debt financing and price 
on syndicated loans. 
Hypothesis 1: Loans in LBOs are influenced by common pricing determinants 
similarly as other syndicated loans. 
The second hypothesis intends to examine the impact of the financial system 
on LBO loan spreads. The market-based financial system is associated with 
common law countries and the bank-based financial system with civil law 
countries. A country with a market-based financial system to finance a LBO 
transaction is a country with better law enforcement and with better protections 
to investors. The second hypothesis aims to investigate the impact of the financial 
system on spreads and pricing processes of loans to LBOs. 
Hypothesis 2: LBO loan spreads and pricing processes differ significantly between 
market-based and bank-based financial systems. 
Carey and Nini (2007) show that spreads on syndicated loans in LBOs are 
higher in the U.S. than in Europe. The third hypothesis has the purpose of testing 
if there is a significant difference in terms of spreads and pricing processes 
between the U.S. and W.E. 
Hypothesis 3: LBO loans spreads arranged to U.S. borrowers are significantly higher 
than those of LBO loan spreads arranged to W.E. borrowers. 
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The fourth hypothesis has the purpose of testing if the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis had a significant impact 
on credit spreads and pricing processes of loans to LBOs. 
Hypothesis 4: After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and loan characteristics, 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis did have a significant impact on LBO loan spreads. 
The fifth hypothesis aims to test the term structure of spreads in LBO loans, 
since Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) and Marques et al. (2015) find non-linear 
relationships between spread and maturity for syndicated loans extended to PF, 
a type of structured finance transaction like LBOs. 
Hypothesis 5: After controlling for microeconomic and macroeconomic pricing factors, 



















4. Data and Sample Selection 
In this chapter, we explain how our database was assembled; the definition of 
the variables used and their respective expected signal; and to present a 
descriptive statistics and preliminary analysis of the sample used. 
4.1 Data Description 
The sample used to determine whether loans in LBOs are more or less 
expensive for borrowers located in market-based versus bank-based financial 
systems, in U.S. versus W.E., examine to what extent loans in LBOs are priced by 
common characteristics with other syndicated loans. Loans data were extracted 
from Dealscan and the sample consists of individual loans between 2000 until 
2013. Macroeconomic variables and firm characteristics were obtained from 
Datastream. 
Dealscan includes information on the microeconomics characteristics of the 
loan, bond offers and borrower. Relatively to the bond offers data available 
includes transaction and tranche size, maturity, currency, pricing rating, and 
type of interest rate. Concerning the borrowers, Dealscan has data on name, 
nationality and industry sector information. Finally, Dealscan contains detailed 
historical information on all syndicated loans settled in international capital 
markets but only loans with a deal specific purpose code of “leveraged buy-out” 
were extracted.  
Deals with no tranche amount or deal amount available and deal status not 
closed or completed were excluded from our sample. Our final sample consists 
in a single loan tranche, multiple issues from the same transaction or deal appear 
as separate observations. 
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From Datastream we collected macroeconomics variables such as level of 
interest rates, market volatility and slope of the yield curve were extracted.  
Data from Datastream and Dealscan were matched, in order to use a unique 
dataset and investigate the impact of firm’s characteristics on credit spreads. 
However, Dealscan does not provide firms identification codes, it was necessary 
to hand-match firms in both databases by using the target name. The principal 
identifier in Dealscan is the firm’s name, ISIN and Ticker are only available for a 
small subset firms, which were used when available. The matching is complex 
and we were conservative and only matches with lower risk were kept, ignoring 
matches that are not unique.  
Our final sample includes 13,315 LBO loans closed between 2000 and 2013 
worth $1,856,630 million. This sample, is the “full sample” being the unit of 
observation a single loan tranche, multiple issues from the same transaction and 
deal appear as separate observations in the database only for deal amount and 
number of facilities, therefore we conduct separate analysis for these variables 
and control our regressions for this. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of loans in LBOs across time, borrower’s 
nationality and industry. Panel A presents an increase of LBO loans between 2000 
and 2007 worth in total $1,320,581 million. In 2007, LBO loans had the highest 
total value of $504,914 million. Since in 2007/2008 the financial crisis has affected 
conditions in capital market, LBO loans had a huge descent having a total value 
of $17,059 million in 2009.  
Panel B reveals that LBO lending is concentrated in the U.S. and W.E. In the 
U.S the total number of loans were 5,821 worth in total $883,235 million and in 
W.E. including U.K. they have 6 362 loans with a total value of $799,183 million.  
The other regions only had 1,132 LBO loans worth in total $174,212 million. This 
values are in line with the idea that countries with developed capital markets and 
with low country risk has higher structured finance transactions such as LBOs. 
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Lastly, Panel C presents the distribution of loans in LBO by industrial category 
of borrower. The highest number of loans is concentrated in the commercial and 
industrial category, more specified in the manufacturing (5,401 loans), services 
(3,140 loans) and retail trade (1,067 loans). 
  
Table 1: Distribution of the full sample of loans in LBOs by year, borrower's nationality 
and industry 
Panel A: Distribution of loans in LBOs by year   
Year Nr of Loans Total Value 
2,000 673 55,596 
2,001 517 44,824 
2,002 585 51,235 
2,003 797 87,983 
2,004 1,151 114,983 
2,005 1,450 186,411 
2,006 1,980 274,635 
2,007 2,182 504,914 
2,008 1,119 152,425 
2,009 228 17,059 
2,010 472 50,674 
2,011 548 82,017 
2,012 475 46,257 
2,013 496 91,623 
2,014 642 95,994 
Total 13,315 1,856,630 
   
Panel B: Geographic distribution of loans in LBOs   
Geographic Location of Borrower Nr of Loans Total Value 
Europe 35 8,841 
Western Europe 4,674 561,849 
U.K. 1,688 237,334 
U.S. 5,821 883,235 
North America 222 39,261 
Asia 397 59,996 
Africa 26 4,570 
Australia 385 42,772 
Caribbean 5 10,720 
Latin America 13 498 
Others 49 7,554 










Panel C: Distribution of loans in LBOs by industrial category of borrower 
Industrial Category of Borrower Nr of Loans Total Value  
Commercial and Industrial     
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 645 64,326 
Mining 197 30,759 
Construction 294 30,841 
Manufacturing 5,401 683,954 
Wholesale Trade 783 88,794 
Retail Trade 1,067 171,531 
Real Estate 205 50,860 
Services 3,140 418,771 
Utilities 765 192,162 
Financial Services  345 71,508 
Transportation 442 49,695 
Public Administration/Government 31 3,429 
Total 13,315 1,856,630 
Note: Table 1 presents the distribution of the full sample of loans in LBOs across time (Panel A), borrower’s 
nationality (Panel B), and industry (Panel C). The first column details the number of loans, while the second 
column describes the total value in $US Million. 
4.2 Variables of the Model 
In this section, an analysis of the variables used in the model will be present. 
Initially, the explained variable will be explained and then the explanatory 
variables divided into macroeconomics independent variables and 
microeconomic independent variables. 
4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Spread (Spread) represents the spread paid by the borrower over Libor plus 
the facility fee (all-in-spread-drawn). Maskara (2010) has also used the AISD for 
the dependent variable, because the all-in-spread-drawn (AISD) 9  holds the 
                                                 
9 “All-in-spread-drawn (AISD) is calculated as the coupon spread plus the annual fee, expressed 
in basis-points. When a loan deal has several tranches, at the deal level, LPC calculates the AISD 
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interest rate of the loan paid by the borrower to the lender. Concerning 
syndicated loans, the all-in-spread-drawn (AISD) does not represent the full 
economic cost of credit (fees), such as commitment fees and up-front fees. As an 
alternative to the AISD, Berg et al. (2015) proposes the ‘total-cost-of-borrowing’ 
(TCB), which accounts for fees and spreads.  
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
The explanatory variables are divided into microeconomic independent 
variables and macroeconomic independent variables. 
4.2.3 Microeconomic Independent Variables 
Maturity represents the maturity of the loan in years. The term structure of 
syndicated loans appears as unknown, so the relationship between spread and 
maturity will help to understand how the maturity influences the spread and the 
slope of the curve between this relationship [Kleimeier and Megginson (2000); 
Colla et al. (2012); Gatti et al. (2013); Ivashina and Kovner (2011); Marques et al. 
(2015)].  
 
Log transaction size is the natural log of the loan transaction size. Transaction 
size is converted into $US when necessary. Researchers such as Kleimeier e 
Megginson (2000), Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), Maskara (2010), Gatti et al. (2013) 
identify that the transaction size affect loans spread for syndicated loans. 
                                                 
for the deal as the weighted average of the spreads for each tranche, where the weight is the 
amount of the loan in that tranche relative to the total amount of that loan.” [Maskara (2010)]. 
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Marques et al. (2015) used Log transaction size in the research and this one was 
significantly positively related to credit spread. 
 
Loan size to deal size is the ratio of the tranche size to the transaction size of 
a given loan. Esty and Megginson (2003) have shown a positive relationship 
between syndicated size and loan pricing. 
However, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) 
conclude that loan size does not reduce loan spreads. 
 
Number of tranches is the number of loans per deal. According to Maskara 
(2010) results, riskier borrowers benefit most from tranching syndicated loans 
having lower credit spreads than other identical non-tranched loans. 
 
Currency risk is a dummy equal to 1 for loans that are denominated in a 
currency different from the currency in the borrower’s home country. According 
to Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), syndicated loan spreads are related to 
currency risk such as other variables. Nevertheless, the currency risk has a 
significantly negative impact on spreads. 
 
Number of lenders is the number of lenders participating in the deal. 
According to Ivashina and Kovner (2011) LBO lenders (sponsors) have better 
loan terms to sellers in the form of higher transactions prices. Meaning financial 
sponsors preserve competition in loan pricing with repeated relationships with 
numerous banks.  
 
Fixed rate is a dummy equal to 1 if a loan has a credit rating and 0 otherwise. 
In line with the Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) study, most bonds are fixed rate while 
loans are priced over a floating base rate. Using the fixed rate instead of floating 
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rate appears to have a significant discount in the pricing because of the insurance 
of the future interest rates of the floating rate. 
 
Rated is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan has a credit rating and 0 otherwise. 
The Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) research concludes that bonds with ratings 
correspond to higher credit quality and associated with lower spreads. Gatti et 
al. (2013) has included the credit rating in the variable country risk and has found 
that spreads are lower in low-risk countries. 
 
Rated*Rated is the interaction between rated dummy variable and rating. The 
rating evaluates the capacity of the borrower to repay interest and principal on 
time as promised. The rating classification used is based on 22 rating scales for 
S&P’s and Moody’s. Loan ratings are based on the S&P and Moody’s rating at 
the time of closing the loan, and converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1; AA+=Aa1=2 
and so on until D=22 [Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) and Gatti et al. (2013)]. 
 
Term loan is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is a term loan and 0 if the loan is 
a credit line. According to Colla et al. (2012), term loans have higher spreads for 
all loans than credit lines. Furthermore, Berg et al. (2015) has discover that it is 
only possible to compute a total-cost-of-borrowing (TCB) measure for term loans. 
4.2.4 Macroeconomic Independent Variables 
Risk free rate is the yield on a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill as the time of signing 
the loan - a proxy for the general level of interest rates. In his research, Marques 
et al.  (2015) has used the risk-free rate and has found that it is negatively related 
with project finance loan credit spreads, i.e., the higher the general level of 
interest rates the lower the spread. 
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Country Risk is the country credit rating at close of S&P’s. This variable 
measures from 1 for the countries with lowest risk (AAA=1) to 22 for the 
countries of highest risk (D=22). The rating is converted as follows: AAA=1; 
AA+=2 and so on until D=22. Other measures of country risk are available and 
were used in other studies but in this thesis, the S&P’s rating were used because 
as Corrielli et al. (2010) has pointed out, there is a strong correlation between the 
S&P’s measures and the alternative measures (monthly data compiled by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) or the country risk rank provided by 
Euromoney magazine). 
 
Volatility represents The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index 
(VIX). VIX reflects a market estimate of future volatility. According to Colla et al. 
(2012), there is a positive and significant relationship between market volatility 
and spreads. Although according to Marques et al. (2015), for project finance 
credit spread and volatility have an insignificant relationship. 
 
5yTB – 3mTB represents the yield curve slope. It was obtained as the 
difference between the U.S. five-year Treasury Bond rate and the U.S. 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate. According to the results presented by Marques et al. (2015), 
spread and the yield curve slope 5Ytb-3mTB are significantly negatively related 
for loans, meaning a steeper yield curve is associated with lower spreads. 
 
Common law is a Dummy equal to 1 if the loan is extended to a borrower 
located in a country with a common law legal regime and 0 otherwise. According 
to Colla et al. (2012) results, loans settled in countries with a common law legal 
system are associated with higher spreads than civil law countries. 
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Market-Based is a Dummy equal to 1 if the loan is extended to a borrower 
located in a country with a market-based financial system and 0 otherwise. 
 
Crisis is a Dummy equal to 1 if the closing date belongs to the crisis period 
and 0 otherwise. In line with the results of Marques et al. (2015), the 2007-2008 
financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis has induced 
an increase in spreads for loans in project finance. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics present in Table 2 allow an analysis regarding the 
performance of the variables of interest, considering the contractual 
characteristics of loans in LBOs. Table 2 present values of the summary statistics 
for the full and high-information of loans in LBOs.  
From the univariate analysis of the full sample (Panel A), only issues that have 
complete data on credit spread were selected likewise values for the deal size and 
loan size variables (deal size and number of tranches). In addition, financial and 
non-financial firms vary across fundamental characteristics. Therefore, deals 
classified with the industrial category of “Financial Institutions” were excluded, 
having eliminated 345 deals.  
In Panel B, the high-information sample consists of 10,753 loans. The high-
information sample is used in the regression analysis. The mean (median) of 
spreads is 345.75 bps (300 bps) and the mean for maturity is 6.33 years. Each 
tranche (loan size) worth on average $138.69 million and each deal has on 
average 6.11 tranches (number of tranches). The mean of deal size is $643.22 
million and each loan as on average 5.75 number of lenders. The loan size to deal 
size mean (median) is 31.80% (21.74%) and the average rating for LBO loans in 
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the high information sample is 14.67. The country risk mean (median) is 1.24 (1) 
which indicates that the spread of each loan has on average a credit rating of 
AAA=Aaa=1. LBO loans are very secure with a guarantee of 97.07%. The 
probability of an occurrence on currency risk in a LBO loan is low (9.09%) and 
the probability on having a fixed rate loan is also extremely low (2.44%). This low 
occurrence of having a fixed rate loan is explained by the fact that LBO loans are 
characterized by having floating interest rates. Finally, the probability of the loan 











Table 2: Contractual characteristics of syndicated loans in LBOs 
Panel A: Univariate analysis of the full sample 
Variable of interest Number Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Continuous variables:             
Spreads (bps) 11 044 346,16 300,00 151,60 35 962,5 
Maturity (years) 12 317 6,29 6,08 1,76 0,08 15,92 
Loan size (US$ million) 13 315 139,44 49,08 363,65 0,43 12500 
Deal size (US$ million) 2 671 586,00 254,22 1152,90 8,66 12500 
Loan size to deal size 13 315 32,52% 22,00% 27,22% 0,00 1 
Number of tranches 2 671 3,66 4 1,92 1 16 
Rating [1-22 weak] 2 464 14,66 15,00 2,34 1 22 
Number of lenders 13 281 5,47 4,00 5,58 1 114 
Country risk [1-22 weak] 13 252 1,33 1,00 1,23 1 15 
Dummy Variables:       
  Nº of issues with data available Nº of issues with dummy=1 % of total available data 
Secured 6 903 6 664 96,54% 
Term loan 13 315 8 920 66,99% 
Currency Risk 13 315 1 222 9,18% 
Financial firms 13 315 345 2,59% 
Fixed rate loan 11 286 451 4,00% 
  
Panel B: Univariate analysis of the high-information sample 
Variable of interest Number Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Continuous variables:             
Spreads (bps) 10,753 345.75 300 151.34 35 962.5 
Maturity (years) 10,292 6.33 6.5 1.65 0.08 15.00 
Loan size (US$ million) 10,753 138.69 50.00 324.87 0.63 8,537.8 
Deal size (US$ million) 1,958 643.22 207.24 1 177.08 9.06 12,178.9 
Loan size to deal size 10,753 31.80% 21.74% 26.26% 0.00 1 
Number of tranches 1,958 6.11 3 1.89 1 16 
Rating [1-22 weak] 2,182 14.67 15 2.32 1 22 
Number of lenders 10,749 5.75 4 5.84 1 114 
Country risk [1-22 weak] 10,709 1.24 1 0.99 1 15 
Dummy Variables:       
  Nº of issues with data available Nº of issues with dummy=1 % of total available data 
Secured 5 558 5 395 97,07% 
Term loan 10 753 7 012 65,21% 
Currency Risk 10 753 977 9,09% 
Financial firms 10 753 0 0,00% 
Fixed rate loan 10 753 262 2,44% 
Note: Spread is the spread paid by the borrower over Libor plus the facility fee (all-in-spread-drawn). The 
loan ratings are based on S&P and Moody's ratings at closing; the rating is converted as follows: 
AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. Country risk is the S&P's country credit rating at closing 
date. The rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. 
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Table 3 provides an analysis and comparison of means and medians for 
continuous variables and levels for discrete variables of the contract 
characteristics between sub-samples. The descriptive statistics for sub-sample are 
grouped (1) whether the borrower is located in a country with a bank-based 
versus a market-based; (2) whether the borrower is located in U.S. versus W.E. 
and (3) whether the crisis has affected an increase in spreads. 
Concerning the sub-sample (1) the mean of spreads diverges across borrowers 
located in market-based relatively to the bank-based financial systems. The 
spread mean (median) is higher for loans concentrated in market-based (371.71 
bps) than the bank-based (286.05 bps). These results are in accordance with Foley 
and Greenwood (2010) since countries with weaker investor protection have a 
higher ownership concentration and therefore use more external finance (debt). 
For the sub-sample (2) the mean spread is also higher for the U.S. (400.32 bps) 
compared to W.E. (293.78 bps).  
The maturity mean does not divergence significantly from market-based to 
bank-based having a mean of 6 years and 7 years respectively, and for the U.S. 
the maturity is 5.5 years and for W.E. it is 7 years. 
Each loan (loan size) worth more on average in countries with market-based 
financial systems ($147.02 million) than in bank-based financial systems ($119.39 
million).  The same is true for W.E. having a higher mean of $55.88 million 
compared to the U.S. of $42 million. 
The deal size mean is higher for countries with market-based ($711.34 million) 
compared to countries which are bank-based ($537.53 million). Similarly, the U.S. 
also has a higher mean of $761.60 million compared to W.E. of $581.64 million. 
The loan size to deal size ratio mean is higher in countries with market-based 
(24.75%) compared with countries with bank-based (17.14%) financial systems. 
The same happens with the U.S. compared with W.E. The loan size to deal size 
is higher for the U.S. (30.25%) compared to W.E. (17.94%).  
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The number of the tranches mean is higher for countries with bank-based 
financial systems (4.58 tranches) and for W.E. (4.52 tranches) in comparison with 
countries with market-based financial systems (3.63 tranches) and for the U.S. 
(2.98 tranches). Therefore, LBO loans are more advantageous when they are 
tranching in W.E. countries with bank-based financial systems. 
The average rating for loans extended for countries with market-based 
financial systems is 14.83 and for the U.S. is 14.96 which are higher compared to 
countries with bank-based financial systems which are 13.33 and 13.64. for W.E.   
Concerning the country risk rating, it does not follow the same results as the 
average rating.  For countries with market-based financial systems and for the 
U.S., the average rating is 1.05 and 1 respectively, being lower than the countries 
with market-based financial systems and for W.E., which are 1.65 and 1.46 
respectively. 
The number of lenders mean is inferior for countries with market-based 
financial systems (4.99) and for the U.S. (4.33) compared to countries with bank-
based financial systems (7.5) and for W.E. (7.1). This difference is explained by 
the fact that the countries with bank-based systems and W.E. have a higher 
number of tranches and the principal financial sector is the bank. 
Relatively to the discrete variables, all the loans are significantly secured but 
the U.S. (96.46%) is the country with lowest percentage of the loans compared 
with W.E. (97.56%), market-based financial systems (97.06%) and bank-based 
financial systems (97.08%). 
The percentage of loans settled as term loans in the bank-based financial 
systems (70.50%) and W.E. (70.28%) are higher compared to the market-based 
financial systems (62.92%) and the U.S. (59.89%), which are more likely to be a 
credit line than a term loan. 
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The currency risk is much smaller in market-based financial systems (8.23%) 
and the U.S. (1.64%) than in bank-based financial systems (10.90%) and W.E. 
(16.18%). 
The fixed rate loan percentage is lower for all the loans of the sub-sample (1) 
and (2) since the floating interest rate is used the most, being a distinguishing 
factor of loans in LBOs. 
Regarding the sub-sample (3) whether the crisis has affected an increase in 
spreads, the average spreads for loans after the crisis (475.21 bps) is significantly 
higher than the pre-crisis (312.22 bps), concluding that the crisis has indeed 
affected an increase in spreads. For the rest of the variables this is also verified, 
except for the maturity, deal size, number of tranches, average rating and the 
term loan which suffered a decrease after the crisis. Maturity and deal size can 
be explained by the fact that banks have lost their capacity of lending after the 
crisis. The number of tranches diminishes after the crisis since loans became more 
controlled and expensive. The average rating can be explained by the fact, that 
after the crisis, the rating became more reliable and more controlled. 
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Table 3: Tests for similar distributions in contract characteristics across sub-samples 









Continuous Variables:               
Spread (bps) Mean 371.71 286.05 400.32 293.78 312.22 475.21 
  Median 350 250 375 250 275 450 
  Number 7,499 3,247 5,245 5,508 8,541 2,212 
Maturity (years) Mean 6 7.08 5.60 7.01 6.56 5.49 
  Median 6 7 5.5 7 7 5 
  Number 7,110 3,175 4,903 5,389 8,121 2,171 
Loan size ($US million) Mean 147.02 119.39 147.19 130.6 137.48 143.39 
  Median 50 51.35 42 55.88 50 47 
  Number 7,499 3,247 5,245 5,508 8,541 2,212 
Deal size ($US million) Mean 711.34 537.53 761.6 581.64 670.26 543.29 
  Median 254.26 254.28 200.25 269.24 264.13 193 
  Number 1,196 758 670 1,288 1,541 417 
Loan size to deal size Mean 35.59% 23.02% 40.37% 23.65% 29.68% 40.00% 
  Median 24.75% 17.14% 30.52% 17.94% 21.27% 26.32% 
  Number 7,499 3,247 5,245 5,508 8,541 2,212 
Number of tranches Mean 3.63 4.58 2.98 4.52 4.23 3.09 
  Median 3 5 3 5 4 3 
  Number 1,196 758 670 1,288 1,541 417 
Rating [1-22 weeks] Mean 14.83 1333 14.96 13.64 14.69 14.53 
  Median 15 14 15 14 15 14 
  Number 1,947 235 1,690 492 1,809 373 
Number of lenders Mean 4.99 7.5 4.33 7.1 6.11 4.33 
  Median 4 5 3 5 4 4 
  Number 7,497 3,245 5,244 5,505 8,539 2,210 
Country Risk [1-22 weeks] Mean 1.05 1.65 1 1.46 1.2 1.37 
  Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  Number 7,471 3,238 5,245 5,464 8,509 2,200 
Discrete Variables:               
Secured % of total available data 97.06% 97.08% 96.46% 97.56% 97.14% 96.71% 
  Issues with data available 3,635 1,920 2,484 3,074 4,584 974 
  Issues with dummy=1 3,528 1,864 2,396 2,999 4,453 942 
Term Loan % of total available data 62.92% 70.50% 59.89% 70.28% 66.63% 59.72% 
  Issues with data available 7,499 3,247 5,245 5,508 8,541 2,212 
  Issues with dummy=1 4,718 2,289 3,141 3,871 5,691 1,321 
Currency Risk % of total available data 8.23% 10.90% 1.64% 16.18% 8.72% 10.49% 
  Issues with data available 7,499 3,247 5,245 5,508 8,541 2,212 
  Issues with dummy=1 617 354 86 891 745 232 
Fixed Rate Loan % of total available data 2.79% 1.57% 0.50% 4.28% 2.13% 3.62% 
  Issues with data available 7,499 3,247 5,245 5,508 8,541 2,212 
  Issues with dummy=1 209 51 26 236 182 80 
Note: Spread is the spread paid by the borrower over Libor plus the facility fee (all-in-spread-drawn). The 
loan ratings are based on S&P and Moody's ratings at closing; the rating is converted as follows: 
AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. Country risk is the S&P's country credit rating at closing 
date. The rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22  
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4.4 Preliminary Analysis 
Table 4 presents an overview of the expected sign of each variable of the high-
information sample divided into sub-samples (Market-based versus Bank-Based 
financial systems and U.S. versus W.E.).  
Concerning the microeconomic independent variables, only the Fixed rate had 
an insignificant impact on the spread. For the macroeconomic independent 
variables, the variables Volatility and Common Law also has little impact on the 
spread. Relatively to the Acquired firms' characteristics only the variable Fixed 
assets to total assets had a significant impact on the spread.  
The variable Maturity has a convex relationship for all the sub-samples having 
a significant impact on the spreads. 
For the sub-sample market-based the variable Maturity has a convex 
relationship impact on the spread. The variables Currency risk, Fixed rate, Country 
Risk, Common Law, Log total assets and Debt to total assets have an insignificant 
influence on the spread. On the other hand, in the bank-based financial systems 
these variables were all significant to the spread except for the variables of the 
acquired firms' characteristics. 
On the sub-sample U.S. the variables Number of tranches, Log total assets, Debt 
to total assets and Short-term debt to total debt have an insignificant impact on 
spread. The sub-sample W.E. had a dissimilar impact on these variables, being 
significant on the spread. However, the variables Fixed rate, Rated, Rated*Rating, 
Common Law, Market-Based, Log total assets, Debt to total assets, Market to book ratio, 
Return on assets have an insignificant impact on the spread. 
In conclusion, the acquired firms' characteristics only had an impact on the 
spread for the sub-samples market-based and U.S. 
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Table 4: Expected sign and findings 
          
Independent Variables Expected  Findings 
  Sign M.B B.B. U.S. W.E. 
Microeconomic Independent Variables:      
Maturity (years) + CX CX CX CX 
Log transaction size - - + - + 
Loan size to deal size - - - - - 
Number of tranches - - - I/- - 
Currency risk + I/+ + - + 
Number of lenders - - - - - 
Fixed rate I/+ I/+ - + I/- 
Rated - - I/+ - I/+ 
Rated*Rating + + I/- + I/- 
Term Loan + + + + + 
Macroeconomic Independent Variable:      
Risk free rate - - - - - 
Country Risk + I/- + N/A + 
Volatility I/+ + - + - 
5yTB-3mTB - - - - - 
Common Law I/+ I/- + N/A I/+ 
Market-Based + N/A N/A N/A I/+ 
Crisis + + + + + 
Acquired firms' characteristics:      
Log total assets I/+ I/+ I/- I/+ I/+ 
Debt to total assets I/+ I/- I/+ I/- I/+ 
Short-term debt to total debt I/- - I/- I/+ - 
Fixed assets to total assets - - - - - 
Market to book ratio I/- - I/+ - I/+ 
Return on assets I/- - I/- - I/+ 
Note: The following characters mean: – = negative impact on spread | + = positive impact on spread | I = 









5. Methodology  
The sample selected for the study of the pricing determinants of loans in LBOs 
uses a sample of 10,753 loans (1,958 deals) closed during 2000-2013 period and 
will be defined as a data sample of longitudinal (panel). This database contains 
observations of the same variables for different countries, firms, financial systems 
and law enforcements at different points across time. Panel data sample is a 
method that will allow to analyze and observe the behavior of the observations 
across time, different determinants, to control heteroskedasticity and less 
collinearity. 
We use an OLS regression with the following model, to estimate the 
determinants of loan pricing: 
 
(1)   𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽8𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖
+  𝛽11𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 +  𝛽13𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽14𝑇𝐵5𝑦 − 𝑇𝐵3𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
  
The sample used is tranche-level observations, thus the analysis of each 
observations is per loan. It is expected that standard errors for each tranche that 
belongs to the same level are correlated with each other. As a solution, the 
standard errors are clustered by deal. 
Model (1) aims at five objectives based on our hypothesis. The first objective 
(hypothesis 1) is to determine which variables have significant and independent 
effects on spreads when the effects of other variables are taken into consideration. 
The second objective (hypothesis 2) tests if the pricing of loans in LBOs closed in 
countries with market-based and bank-based financial systems affects the costs 
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of spreads and pricing process. The third objective (hypothesis 3) investigates if 
the pricing of LBO loans in the U.S. and W.E. are correlated with debt markets 
(bank-based financial systems). Along with the existence of differences in LBO 
loan spreads between W.E. and U.S., in other words, if the LBO loan spreads in 
W.E. are lower compared to the U.S. The fourth objective (hypothesis 4) 
determines if the 2007-2008 financial crisis had an impact on loan spreads and 
pricing processes, after controlling the other micro and macro pricing factors. The 
final objective (hypothesis 5) examines the term structure of syndicated loans, 
focusing on the relationship between spread and maturity, while controlling for 



















In this section, the results from the regression analysis are presented, analyzed 
and compared with empirical literature previously mentioned. 
6.1 Results of the regression analysis 
6.1.1 Are loans in LBOs priced in integrated debt markets? 
To examine if the spreads on loans closed in the two different financial systems 
(market-based and bank-based) are significantly different, equation (1) was used. 
Additionally, a dummy variable Market-Based was created and set equal to 1 if 
the tranche is extended to a borrower in a market-based financial system and 0 if 
extended to a borrower in a bank-based financial systems. In order to isolate legal 
systems and financial system impact, an additional control variable was included 
in equation (1), the common law dummy variable. This variable was added since 
the financial systems is normally related with legal traditions. The dummy 
variable is equal to 1 if loans are extended to common law countries and 0 if loans 
are extended to civil law countries. Finally, the variables region and industry were 
included as a control on fixed effects. 
Table 5 presents the regression analysis of the determinants on credit spreads 
for equation (model [1]). All loans and then divided into sub-groups: (model [1a]) 
Market-based financial systems; (model [1b]) Bank-based financial systems; 
(model [1c]) U.S.; (Model [1d]) W.E. It is also present an equation (model [2]) U.S. 
and W.E. where the U.S. dummy variable is included. All these estimations have 
control for fixed-effects variables region and industry. 
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Concerning equation (Model [1]), the sample is constituted by 10,244 loans and 
LBO loans extended to borrowers in market-based financial systems are 
associated with higher spreads, since the dummy variable is statistically 
significant with an increase in spread by 13.38 bps.  
It is expected that credit spreads for loans extended to U.S. borrowers to be 
higher compared to loans extended to borrowers in W.E. Therefore, to estimate 
if credit spreads are higher in the U.S. than in W.E., in equation 1 (model [2]) the 
dummy variable U.S. was added being 1 if the loan is extended to a U.S. 
borrower, and 0 otherwise. The equation (model [2]) reports the variables 
estimation for a sample of 10,244 loans (4,902 loans extended to U.S borrowers 
and 5,342 loans extended to W.E. borrowers). The estimation results meet the 
expected prediction, the U.S. dummy variable is statistically significant, 
increasing the spreads by 33.26 bps. Loans in W.E. are indeed associated with 
lower spreads, holding other factors constant. Concerning the sub-samples 
equation (model [1c] and [1d]), this result does not change. In model [1d], a 
dummy variable common law was created representing U.K. It is based on 
whether W.E. borrower is located in Continental Europe or in the U.K. once that 
the U.K. is the only country in W.E. with a common law legal system. Since the 
estimation of the variable common law is statistically insignificant, the spreads are 
lower for W.E., knowing that LBO loans credit spreads does not differ 
significantly for borrowers based on Continental Europe nor the U.K. As a 




Table 5: Regression analysis of the determinant of credit spreads 








Spreads (bps) [1] [2] [1a] [1b] [1c] [1d] 
Independent Variables       
Constant 292.00*** 287.03*** 438.16*** 96.04*** 506.77*** 76.59*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Maturity 20.72*** 20.71*** 14.67*** 27.64*** -24.45*** 27.12*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Transaction Size -8.04*** -7.31*** -18.73*** 14.41*** -24.45*** 13.60*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Size to Deal Size -104.24*** -105.03*** -121.04*** -68.13*** -137.49*** -72.41*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of tranches -3.06** -3.56*** -3.56** -5.27*** -3.23 -6.44*** 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) 
Currency Risk 14.26*** 21.05*** 8.35 30.75*** -68.06*** 19.35*** 
 (0.05) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of lenders -2.24*** -2.33*** -2.33*** -2.20*** -2.99*** -2.34*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Fixed Rate 14.95 17.56 43.58 -57.90** 87.37* -24.43 
 (0.54) (0.48) (0.20) (0.05) (0.07) (0.29) 
Rated -59.06*** -59.79*** -102.33*** 25.97 -144.99*** 22.42 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.35) 
Rated*Rating 3.36** 3.41** 6.97*** -1.01 10.07*** -0.62 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.73) 
Term Loan 75.38*** 75.55*** 89.18*** 55.14*** 102.86*** 58.86*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk Free Rate -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.14*** -0.25*** -0.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Country Risk 4.78*** 3.47** -4.43 3.45*  3.37*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.60) (0.07)  (0.01) 
Volatility 0.12 0.12 1.23*** -1.91*** 2.08*** -1.05*** 
 (0.61) (0.62) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
5yTB-3mTB -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.19*** -0.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Crisis 108.20*** 107.84*** 95.03*** 139.59*** 72.71*** 145.06*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Law 3.62  -13.66 22.04***  9.80 
 (0.61)  (0.11) (0.00)  (0.13) 
Market-Based 13.38**     1.00 
 (0.05)     (0.00) 
U.S.  33.26**     
  (0.02)     
Fixed Effects       
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of Observations 10,244 10,244 7,080 3,164 4,902 5,342 
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.42 0.34 
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Note: Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions analyzing the determinants of loan credit spread. 
Model [1] reflects the high-information sample of 10,244 loans with a deal specific purpose code of 
“leveraged buy-out”. Model [2] isolates the 10,244 loans extended to both W.E. and the U.S. Models [1a] and 
[1b] focus on sub-samples created according to whether the loan is arranged to a borrower in a market-
based or bank-based financial system. Models [1c] and [1d] are estimated for two sub-samples created 
according to whether the borrower is located in W.E. or the U.S. Common law equals 1 if the loan is extended 
to a borrower in a common law country, and 0 otherwise. Market-based equals 1 if the loan is extended to a 
borrower in a country with a market-based financial system, and 0 otherwise. U.S. equals 1 if the loan is 
extended to a borrower located in the U.S. and 0, otherwise. For each independent variable, the first row 
reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based 
on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by deal. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control for fixed-effects variables region and industry. 
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6.1.2 Determinants of spreads for the high-information sample. 
Since it is not possible to create a single model with borrowers in both market-
based and bank-based financial systems as well as loans extended to U.S. and 
W.E. borrowers, the analysis will focus on the characteristics that affect credit 
spread separately. 
In Table 5, models [1a] and [1b] present loan pricing regression results for a 
sample of 7,080 loans extended to borrowers in market-based and 3,164 loans 
bank-based financial systems. Models [1c] and [1d] portray the impact of 
common pricing factors on credit spreads for loans extended to U.S. borrowers 
with a sample of 4,902 and 5,342 loans extended to W.E. borrowers. 
Concerning the influence of maturity on spread, the results presented 
demonstrate a significantly positive relationship for loans arranged in market-
based and bank-based financial systems. On the other hand, for loans closed in 
the U.S., the influence of Maturity on spread is negative and for W.E. is positive. 
The coefficient values indicate that issuing a loan, with an original maturity one 
year longer than the mean, decreases spread by 24.45 bps for the U.S. and 
increases spread by 27.12 bps for W.E. 
Once more the U.S. has a significant negative influence (-24.45 bps) of Log 
transaction size in loan spread. The market-based financial systems have the same 
negative influence with a decrease of 18.73 bps on spreads. Furthermore, loans 
extended to borrowers in bank-based financial systems and loans closed in W.E. 
have a significant positive impact on spreads, having an increase of 14.41 bps and 
13.60 bps, respectively. Since loans extended to bank-based are more 
concentrated in larger deals, banks could apply a higher spread to compensate 
the larger share in bank loan portfolios.  
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Loan size to deal size has a different impact on spreads compared to what was 
expect in the descriptive analysis. In all the sub-samples the impact is significant 
and negative, which means that an increase in the weight of each tranche size 
will decrease the spread implied for loans in LBOs. For example, an increase of 
10 percentage points of the loan size to deal size will decrease the implied spread 
by 12.10 bps for the market-based financial systems and 7.24 bps for the loans 
closed in W.E. Higher loan size to deal size ratio could indicate a lower risk for 
lenders since banks can only retain a higher loan on its balance sheet if the risk is 
minimized. In addition, larger loans are associated to senior loans. Relatively to 
the number of tranches, once more the impact is significant and negative except for 
loans extended to U.S. borrower which is not significant. In conclusion, LBO 
loans can benefit from tranching. 
The influence of currency risk on spread has no impact on the market-based 
financial systems. However, for the bank-based financial systems (and for the 
U.S. as well) the impact is significant and positive, meaning an increase on the 
currency risk will increase the spread by 30.75 bps (19.35 bps). For loans extended 
to U.S. borrowers closed in other currency than $US, the currency risk significantly 
decreases the spread by 68.06 bps.  
The number of lenders has a significant and negative impact on all the sub-
samples. For example, for loans extended to market-based financial systems for 
each additional lender the spread decrease by 2.33 bps. The higher the number 
of lenders the lower the risk of default, since the risk is distributed across 
different lenders. 
The variable fixed rate is only significant for loans extended to bank-based 
financial systems and for loans arranged to the U.S. The impact on the spread is 
different, being negative for the bank-based (57.90 bps decrease in spread) and 
positive for the U.S. (87.37 bps increase in spread). 
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The impact of Rated and Rated*Rating on spread for loans arranged in W.E. and 
for loans extended to the bank-based financial systems is insignificant. Credit risk 
information regarding this two sub-samples is scant, that could explain this 
insignificant relationship between spread and credit risk.  
The impact of Rated and Rated*Rating on loans extended to market-based 
financial systems and for loans extended to the U.S. on spreads is significant. A 
one-unit increase in credit rating (corresponding a downgrade from AAA to 
AA+) is associated with a decrease on spreads of 102.33 bps and 144.99 bps and 
an increase of spread of 6.97 bps and 10.07 bps, respectively. For the coefficient 
estimation of Term loan, the influence on spread is significant and positive for all 
sub-samples, which indicates a higher spread than credit lines. 
Regarding the Risk free rate influence on spreads, the impact is significant and 
negative for all sub-samples. Country risk estimation is significant and positive 
for loans arranged to W.E. borrowers and extended to bank-based financial 
systems. Loans to borrowers with a grading bellow AAA (AAA=1) will increase 
spread by 3.45 bps and 3.37 bps, respectively.  
Spread and the yield curve slope (5yTB-3mTB) are greatly related to loans 
extended to all sub-samples, meaning a steeper yield curve is associated with 
lower spreads. The volatility has the same impact on spreads, being negatively 
significant to all sub-samples. This negative influence is explained by the fact that 
when there is an increase in volatility there is a change on the financing source 
from bond markets to loan syndicated markets. This result diverges from those 
by Colla et al. (2012) which say that credit spread and equity volatility explain 
the increase of tranche spreads. 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt 
crisis had a significant impact for loans in LBOs, namely an increase in spreads. 
Loans arranged for borrowers in market-based and bank-based financial systems 
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had an increase in spreads of 95.03 bps 139.59 bps, respectively, if the transaction 
has an active date during de crisis period.  
Lastly, the influence of common law on loan credit spread is only significant 
and positive for bank-based financial systems. Concerning loans extended to 
W.E. borrowers, the difference between loan spreads is not due by the type of the 
financial system or by the type of legal system.  
In conclusion, borrowers located in market-based financial systems and in U.S. 
face in general lower spreads for loans to LBO in comparison with bank-based 
financial system and W.E. The determinants that decrease spreads for all the sub-
samples are number of lenders, risk free rate and yield curve slope. The maturity, log 
transaction size, loan size to deal size, currency risk, currency risk, rated decrease 
spread for U.S. borrowers. Finally, for borrowers in market-based financial 
systems the determinants that decrease spreads are log transaction size, number of 
tranches and rated.  
6.1.3 The impact of the financial crisis on credit spreads. 
Following the descriptive analysis and the results presented in section 5.1.2. it 
can be concluded that the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis had a significant impact for loans in LBOs, namely an 
increase in spreads. Since the objective is to investigate this impact on spreads 
and pricing process (hypothesis 4) the high-information sample was divided into 
a pre-crisis period from January 1, 2000 to September 14, 2008, and a crisis period 
from September 15, 2008 (Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing date) through 
December 31, 2013. 
Table 6 presents estimation results for a sample with all loans, model [1] and 
[2], and the sub-samples for the U.S. (model [1c]) and W.E. (model [1d]) 
presented for both periods, namely pre-crisis and crisis. In model [1], in the pre-
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crisis period, borrowers in countries with market-based financial system face an 
increase of 13.27 in spread but the law systems, namely the common law variable, 
does not have an influence on spread before the crisis. In the crisis period, 
common law is the only variable whose influence is associated with higher spreads 
with an increase of 41.12 bps. Thus, the financial system has no influence in 
spread in the crisis period, which is why only the sub-samples U.S. and W.E. 
where analyzed. 
The type of factors that explain loan credit spreads has changed. Maturity, 
currency risk, country risk and yield curve slope are the characteristics with 
greatest influence. For model [1], in the crisis period, the influence of the yield 
curve slope is statistically negative and might derive from a downturn in 
economic growth. Country risk influence on spread during the crisis is positive 
because of the downgraded sovereign ratings from W.E. countries. For model [2], 
in pre-crisis, the U.S. dummy has a significant positive impact on spreads but, in 
the crisis-period this result is no longer valid. These results indicate that the U.S. 
has not suffered from an increase in spread. 
Concerning loans extended to U.S. borrowers, in model [1c] the principal 
changes of the coefficient influence in spread in both periods and are related to 
rated, rated*rating and risk free rate which became insignificant during the crisis 
period. On the contrary, log transaction size and fixed rate became significant and 
negative. 
Model [1d] presents results for loans extended to W.E. borrowers and the 
coefficients Rated, Rated*rating and market-based became insignificant during the 
crisis. On the other hand, Currency risk and Volatility have turned into significant 
coefficients. Lastly, the financial system has no influence in spreads during the 
crisis period and the dummy Common law also has no influence in spreads, 
meaning that the U.K. have not suffered an increase in spreads comparing to 
W.E. countries. These results are consistent with the fact that the U.K. is a country 
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with common law legal system and has a better law enforcement with better 
protections. Hypothesis 4 is valid. 
























Independent Variables         
Constant 244.36*** 543.56*** 231.18*** 576.33*** 254.86*** 592.79*** 223.95*** 471.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Maturity 22.30*** 11.63*** 22.30*** 11.67*** 22.27*** 12.83*** 21.92*** 13.28*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Transaction Size -3.50* -20.58*** -2.67 -19.41*** -2.77 -19.77*** -4.22** -19.26*** 
 (0.07) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
Loan Size to Deal Size -109.48*** -107.94*** -110.29*** -106.95*** -110.32*** -109.30*** -109.11*** -109.40*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of tranches -3.09** -10.98*** -3.60** -10.92*** -3.65*** -11.62*** -3.09** -11.58*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Currency Risk 8.86 23.27* 16.16*** 35.14** 12.02** 35.37*** 8.76 28.15** 
 (0.14) (0.1) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.14) (0.05) 
Number of lenders -2.25*** -5.53*** -2.33*** -5.88*** -2.35*** -5.35*** -2.14*** -5.31*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Fixed Rate 44.56 -53.57 48.96* -57.69 37.55 -77.49** 45.98 -49.84 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.08) (0.15) (0.17) (0.05) (0.12) (0.18) 
Rated -74.28*** 3.16 -75.71*** 5.69 -73.00*** 1.34 -70.43*** -47.18 
 (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.93) (0.00) (0.98) (0.00) (0.49) 
Rated*Rating 3.71*** 2.32 3.81*** 2.10 3.63** 2.33 3.47** 5.77 
 (0.01) (0.60) (0.01) (0.63) (0.02) (0.59) (0.02) (0.21) 
Term Loan 76.18*** 78.88*** 76.35*** 77.68*** 76.25*** 78.50*** 76.09*** 78.31*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk Free Rate -0.16*** -0.50 -0.16*** -0.36 -0.16*** -0.37 -0.15*** -0.35*** 
 (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) 
Country Risk 3.19 8.39*** 1.66 6.90***   2.89 8.64*** 
 (0.17) (0.00) (0.46) (0.01)   (0.21) (0.00) 
Volatility 0.10 0.39 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.22 1.35*** 0.81* 
 (0.68) (0.31) (0.64) (0.43) (0.67) (0.59) (0.00) (0.07) 
5yTB-3mTB -0.13*** -0.26*** -0.12*** -0.27*** -0.13*** -0.27*** -0.19*** 0.20*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Law -0.06 41.12*     -0.43 39.10 
 (0.99) (0.1)     (0.95) (0.16) 
Market-Based 13.27** 12.31     13.11** 11.64 
 (0.05) (0.61)     (0.05) (0.66) 
U.S.   45.79*** 12,44     
   (0.00) (0.71)     
Fixed Effects         
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of Observations 8,087 2,157 8,087 2,157 8,087 2,157 8,087 2,157 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.25 
Note: Table 6 presents the results of OLS regressions analyzing the determinants of loan credit spread. 
Models [1], [2], [1c] and [1d] are re-estimated for two sub-samples created by considering a pre-crisis period 
from January 1, 2000 through September 14, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15, 2008 (Lehman 
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Brothers' bankruptcy filing date) through December 31, 2013. Common law equals 1 if the loan is extended 
to a borrower in a common law country, and 0 otherwise. Market-based equals 1 if the loan is extended to a 
borrower in a country with a market-based financial system, and 0 otherwise. U.S. equals 1 if the loan is 
extended to a borrower located in the U.S. and 0, otherwise. For each independent variable, the first row 
reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based 
on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by deal. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control for fixed-effects variables region and industry. 
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6.1.4 The term structure of spreads 
On section 5.1.2, the regression results for the influence of maturity on spreads 
is significant and linearly positive for model [1], [2], [1a], [1b], [1d], except for 
model [1c] which is significantly linearly negative. These results are in line with 
with Colla et al. (2012) who found a positive relationship between maturities and 
spreads, since lenders require a higher remuneration due to the liquidity risk. 
Nevertheless, recent studies suggest a hump-shaped term structure of credit 
spreads for project finance loans which can also be applied for LBO loans [Sorge 
and Gadanecz (2008) and Marques et al. (2015)]. To test this hump-shaped term 
structure it was added to the high-information sample components of non-linear 
maturity.  
Table 7 presents the regression results with the natural logarithm of maturity 
(log maturity) for all loans (model [3]) and the sub-samples for loans extended to 
market-based (model [3a]) and bank-based (model [3b]) financial systems; U.S. 
(model [3c]) and W.E. (model [3d]). A convex relationship is found between 
credit spread and log maturity for all the models. LBO loan spreads extended to 
market-based-based financial systems and extended to W.E. are the models 
where the non-linear relationship between credit spread and maturity is more 
pronounced. 
This convex relationship between credit spread and maturity can be explained 
by the intrinsic characteristics of LBO transactions and by loan market effects. In 
section 2.5 this hump-shaped relationship is explained by the fact that the short-
term liquidity for shorter maturities increase the spreads because of the liquidity 
risk. However, in longer maturities the cash-flow of the acquired firm are higher 
and the liquidity risk is smaller, then the LBO loans spreads required are lower. 
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Figure 2 – Term structure loans extended to market-based borrowers 
  
Note: Graphs A and B are based on model [3a]. Graph A plots credit spread against maturity, it plots the 
prediction from a quadratic regression and adds the confidence interval on the basis of the standard error 
of forecast. Graph B presents the augmented component-plus-residual and depicts the partial relationship 
between credit spread and maturity, once all other micro and macro factors have been controlled for. The 
straight line corresponds to the regression model. The curved line reflects the fitting process based on non-
parametric regression. 
 
Figure 3 – Term structure loans extended to W.E. borrowers 
  
Note: Graphs A and B are based on model [3d]. Graph A plots credit spread against maturity, it plots the 
prediction from a quadratic regression and adds the confidence interval on the basis of the standard error 
of forecast. Graph B presents the augmented component-plus-residual and depicts the partial relationship 
between credit spread and maturity, once all other micro and macro factors have been controlled for. The 
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Table 6: Regression Analysis of the term structure of spreads 
Dependent Variable 
All Loans with 







U.S. with log 
maturity  
W.E. with log 
maturity 
Spreads (bps) [3] [3a] [3b] [3c] [3d] 
Independent Variables          
Constant 
 
360.90*** 550.00*** 141.25*** 594.79*** 137.49*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Maturity 
 
63.83*** 67.94*** 71.23*** 60.15*** 72.23*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Maturity 
 
-173.43*** -222.45*** -167.76*** -194.62*** -183.69*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Transaction Size 
 
-11.90*** -24.82*** 12.43*** -31.02*** 11.31*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Size to Deal Size 
 
-95.97*** -115.79*** -45.26*** -135.66*** -52.30*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of tranches 
 
-3.64*** -3.93** -6.08*** -3.13 -7.17*** 
-0,01 (0.03) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) 
Currency Risk 
 
15.85*** 9.55 34.53*** -71.64*** 20.96*** 
(0.01) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of lenders 
 
-1.93*** -1.94*** -1.87*** -2.68*** -2.02*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Fixed Rate 
 
12,38 39.91 -66.45 78.90* -23.04 
(0.61) (0.23) (0.04) (0.10) (0.35) 
Rated 
 
-49.17** -85.93*** 32.98 -125.06*** 29.87 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.19) 
Rated*Rating 
 
2.66* 5.91*** -1.56 8.74*** -1.09 
(0.07) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.53) 
Term Loan 
 
58.83*** 72.23*** 33.06*** 88.07*** 37.47*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk Free Rate 
 
-0.20*** -0.22*** -0.17 -0.26*** -0.13*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Country Risk 
 
4.91*** -0.19 3.07  3.09* 
(0.01) (0.98) (0.13)  (0.10) 
Volatility 
 
0.07 1.18*** -2.04*** 2.05*** -1.03*** 
(0.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
5yTB-3mTB 
 
-0.20*** -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.19*** -0.17*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Crisis 
 
113.23*** 101.38*** 144.44*** 79.47*** 150.66*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Law 
 
0.62 -16.93** 16.39  6.96 
(0.93) (0.13) (0.47)  (0.29) 
Market-Based 
 
20.51***    7.76 
(0.00)    (0.22) 
Fixed Effects           
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of Observations 10,244 7,080 3,164 5,342 5,342 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.38 
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Note: Models [3], [3a], [3b], [3c], and [3d] are similar to models [2], [1a], [1b], [1c], and [1d], respectively, 
adding the logarithmic of maturity. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated 
coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered by deal. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 



































7. The impact of acquired firm’s characteristics on 
spreads and pricing processes 
Previous studies have analyzed the impact of firm characteristics on spreads 
and pricing processes. Therefore, in this section a univariate and multivariate 
analysis will be presented. According to Ivashina and Kovner (2011) acquired 
firms’ characteristics like leverage, efficiency and profitability have influence on 
spreads. On the other hand, Colla et al. (2012) research has verified that only the 
characteristics of the target firm, namely pre-LBO profitability affects spreads, 
since they found a significant negative and insignificant relationships between 
spreads and leverage level, respectively. 
7.1 Univariate Analysis 
From the hand-matching code firm of the database samples, an analysis to the 
impact of the firms’ characteristics on credit spreads was realized. The sample 
includes 1,290 LBO loans closed between 2000 and 2013 to acquire 607 publicly 
traded firms located in W.E. and the U.S., due to the lack of information for public 
acquired firms outside the U.S. and W.E. The hand-matching consists in LBO 
firm characteristics reported around the loan closing date. The firm 
characteristics to use as explanatory variables are Total assets, Debt to total assets, 
Short-term debt to total debt, Fixed assets to total assets, Market-to-book ratio and 
Return on assets.  
Firm size (total assets) and market-to-book ratio are used as alternatives 
variables for the asymmetric information problem. Firms with higher 
asymmetric information problems have a higher probability of paying more 
expensive spreads. The market-to-book ratio variable is used to measure the 
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firm’s potential growth and cash flow. Smith and Watts (1992) has identified the 
capital expenditures/value ratio an alternative represent for the cash flow of the firm’s 
investment opportunities.  
Debt to total assets and the short-term debt to total debt are alternative 
variables for borrower’s potential level of financial constraint. According to 
Ivashina and Kovner (2011) results there is a significant relation between spreads 
and leverage. However, Colla et al. (2012) results presents an insignificant 
negative relation between spreads and leverage. But there’s is an expectation to 
prove the contrary since firms with financial problems and with short-term debt 
to total debt have higher risk to bankruptcy. Fixed assets to total assets are used as 
a proxy for asset tangibility since it reflects the value of firms’ liquidation. 
Moreover, the greater the asset tangibility the bigger the expected recovery in 
default and the lower the spread required. 
Table 8 presents the characteristics of public firms that were acquired as LBO 
transactions. The descriptive analysis is based on the deals and the sample is 
divided into sub-samples: firms located in market-based, bank-based financial 
system and firms located in the U.S. and W.E. 
Concerning the short-term debt to total debt median, the acquired firms in 
market-based financial systems have lower levels compared to the firms in bank-
based financial systems. For firms located in the U.S. the result is similar, having 
a lower short-term debt to total debt median compared to W.E. It is expected that 
firms in market-based financial systems, as well as in the U.S., have lower 
spreads. The market-to-book ratio mean is higher for firms located in market-based 
financial systems and for the U.S., meaning they have a higher potential growth 
and cash flow. During the pre-crisis firms had a higher asset tangibility compared 




Table 8: Tests for similar distributions in contract characteristics across sub-sample 
 
Note: Table 8 reports characteristics of public firms that were acquired via a LBO transaction. Our sample 
includes 607 LBO deals closed in W.E. and the U.S. between 2000 and 2014. We created three sub-samples 
according to whether firms are located in market-based (382 deals) or bank-based (116 deals) financial 
systems, in the U.S. (270 deals) or in W.E. (228 deals), and were closed in the pre-crisis (373 deals) or crisis 

















U.S. W.E. Pre-Crisis Crisis 
Total assets (in $US million) Mean 2,926.91 4,950.02 3,248.69 3,575.14 3,539.85 3,350.67 
 Median 13.48 13.29 13.61 13.26 13.47 13.34 
 Number 382 116 270 228 373 125 
Debt to total assets Mean 0.34 0.26 0.37 0.27 0.31 0.34 
 Median 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.23 0.27 0.23 
 Number 382 116 270 228 373 125 
Short-term debt to total debt Mean 0.27 0.36 0.23 0.37 0.30 0.27 
 Median 0.10 0.28 0.06 0.28 0.15 0.15 
 Number 337 107 233 211 314 103 
Fixed assets to total assets Mean 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.30 0.24 
 Median 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.15 
 Number 382 115 270 227 372 125 
Market to book ratio Mean 2.37 0.94 1.77 2.36 1.00 5.08 
 Median 2.31 2.17 2.24 2.31 2.22 2.35 
 Number 376 111 264 223 363 124 
Return on assets Mean -0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.11 
 Median 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 
 Number 347 99 251 195 329 117 
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7.2 Multivariate Analysis 
For the multivariate analysis, the firm characteristics were included as control 
variables. 
In table 9, models [4] and [5] reflect the high-information sample of 1,290 loans 
with a deal specific purpose code of “leveraged buy-out”—these models have the 
same number of observations because information on acquired firm 
characteristics for transactions outside W.E. and the U.S. is not available. Models 
[4a] and [4b] focus on sub-samples created according to whether the loan is 
arranged to a borrower in a market-based or bank-based financial system. 
Models [4c] and [4d] are estimated for two sub-samples created according to 
whether the borrower is located in W.E. or the U.S. 
Regarding models [4] and [5] the results are different compared to section 
5.1.2. The variable market-based is no longer significant but the U.S. is still 
significant reflecting on an increase of 73.40 bps in spreads compared to W.E. The 
law legal system, namely the variable common law is not significant for both 
models. For the firm control variables, namely debt to total assets leverage does 
not affect credit spreads having an insignificant relation. These results are in line 
with those presented by Ivashina and Kovner (2011). Regarding the sub-samples 
market-based versus bank-based financial systems, this result remains, meaning 
book leverage does not have an influence in spreads. However, firms located in 
market-based have a significant negative influence of short-term debt to total debt 
on spreads (20.60 bps) compared to the bank-based where it is insignificant. 
According to Barclay and Smith (1995) evidence, firms with larger potential 
information asymmetries (market-to-book ratio) issues more short-term debt. This 
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evidence is supported by the results presented on table 9, since targets with a 
significant market-to-book ratio face lower spreads. 
For the sub-samples U.S. versus W.E. the short-term debt to total debt is 
significant and negative for firms located in W.E. facing a decrease in spreads of 
29.93 bps. Leverage and total assets have an insignificant relation with spreads 
for both models. The market-to-book ratio and the return on assets are significant 
for the U.S., facing a decrease in spread. This results is like those presented by 
Colla et al. (2012), the pre-LBO profitability affects the pricing of debt in LBOs. 
Comparing the regression results from Table 5 of microeconomic and 
macroeconomic factors on spreads, the coefficients have different impacts. 
Namely, the number of tranches, the fixed rate and the country risk are no longer 
significant for all the models and the currency risk is only significant for the U.S. 
(model [4c]). Crisis and common law have no influence in spreads for loans 
extended to bank-based financial systems and for W.E. These differences can be 
explained by the fact that the number of observations is much smaller compared 



















Table 9: Regression Analysis of the determinants of credit spreads: the impact of acquired 
firm’s characteristics 
Dependent Variable All Loans U.S. and W.E. 
Market-
Based 
Bank-Based U.S. W.E. 
Spreads (bps) [4] [5] [4a] [4b] [4c] [4d] 
Independent Variables       
Constant 303.22*** 290.08*** 429.46*** 118.15 578.75*** 98.29 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (0.25) 
Maturity 12.22*** 12.39*** 5.32 31.41*** -3.16 28.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) 
Log Transaction Size -12.50* -11.70* -24.37*** 29.13*** -29.85*** 11.86 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) 
Loan Size to Deal Size -83.92*** -84.41*** -102.97*** 13.19 -125.06*** -24.05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.50) 
Number of tranches -1.07 -1.55 -0.60 -3.64 -1.27 -4.23 
 (0.64) (0.52) (0.79) (0.47) (0.55) (0.29) 
Currency Risk -3.32 6.34 -7.32 78.38 -58.54*** 9.60 
 (0.81) (0.66) (0.59) (0.17) (0.00) (0.54) 
Number of lenders -2.77*** -2.85*** -2.27** -6.40*** -1.42* -5.24** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) 
Fixed Rate 71.93 72.74 49.02 0.00 22.99 0.00 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.30) (Omitted) (0.58) (Omitted) 
Rated -121.87*** -119.97*** -169.22*** -21.77 -158.92*** -5.60 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) (0.97) 
Rated*Rating 9.07*** 8.95*** 12.36*** 3.92 11.95*** 1.15 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.723) (0.00) (0.90) 
Term Loan 82.47*** 82.47*** 98.52*** 36.88*** 120.05*** 47.89*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk Free Rate -0.15** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.20 -0.26*** -0.25** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.00) (0.05) 
Country Risk 9.23 6.74 8.81 11.51  9.85 
 (0.28) (0.44) (0.79) (0.25)  (0.34) 
Volatility 0.82* 0.81* 1.03** 1.28 1.57*** 1.40 
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.05) (0.28) (0.01) (0.13) 
5yTB-3mTB -0.18* -0.19* -0.19** -0.22 -0.33*** -0.11 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.38) (0.00) (0.60) 
Crisis 103.40*** 101.56*** 98.57*** 81.55 77.15*** 72.52 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.13) 
Common Law 12.03  0.05 -42.81  26.36 
 (0.34)  (1.00) (0.236)  (0.13) 
Market-Based 7.96     -13.22 
 (0.61)     (0.52) 
U.S.  73.40**     
  (0.04)     
Log total Assets 2.44 1.52 3.83 -8.13 1.82 0.62 
 (0.64) (0.77) (0.45) (0.56) (0.74) (0.94) 
Debt to total assets 15.57 15.85 -3.89 41.24 -6.42 35.98 
 (0.32) (0.31) (0.70) (0.23) (0.49) (0.20) 
Short term debt to total debt -15.63 -15.78 -20.60* -29.58 0.92 -29.93** 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.14) (0.94) (0.03) 
Fixed assets to total assets -53.93*** -48.15*** -43.84*** -177.22*** -32.75* -88.73*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) 
Market to book ratio -0.16 -0.13 -0.22** 0.54 -0.19** 0.05 
 (0.29) (0.41) (0.03) (0.26) (0.04) (0.86) 
Return on assets -7.41 -6.72 -19.73** -67.42 -17.14** 56.97 
 (0.54) (0.57) (0.02) (0.75) (0.02) (0.42) 
Fixed Effects       
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,290 1,290 1,005 285 715 575 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.44 0.29 
 61 
Note: Table 9 presents the results of OLS regressions analyzing the determinants of loan credit spread. 
Common law equals 1 if the loan is extended to a borrower in a common law country, and 0 otherwise. 
Market-based equals 1 if the loan is extended to a borrower located in a market-based financial system, and 
0 otherwise. U.S. equals 1 if the loan is extended to a borrower located in the U.S. and 0, otherwise. For each 
independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. 
Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by deal. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control for fixed-effects 
variables region and industry. 
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7.2.1 Term structure of spreads with firm’s characteristics 
 
 Since the term structure remains a puzzle for most of the previous studies, an 
analysis to the term structure of spreads was made. The models presented in 
Table 7 were re-estimated including acquired firm’s characteristics as additional 
regressors.   
 In Table 10, the relation between credit spread and maturity is still a robust 
convex relationship. Concerning the acquired firms’ characteristics, once more 
leverage has no effect on spread. The short-term debt to total debt has no influence 
on spreads. However, targets with a significant market-to-book ratio face lower 
spreads. 
For the sub-samples U.S. versus W.E. the short-term debt to total debt is 
significant and negative for firms located in W.E. facing a decrease in spreads of 
29.93 bps. Leverage and total assets have an insignificant relation with spreads 
for both models. The market-to-book ratio has a significant impact on firms located 
on market-based financial systems and the U.S. facing a decrease of 0.28 bps and 
0.25 bps on spreads, respectively. However, for firms located in bank-based the 
results is different. The market-to-book ratio has a significant impact but positive, 











Table 10: Regression Analysis of the term structure of spreads with firms' characteristics 
Dependent Variable 








U.S. with log 
maturity 
W.E. with log 
maturity 
Spreads (bps) [6] [6a] [6b] [6c] [6d] 
Independent Variables      
Constant 318.23*** 461.50*** 148.03 585.69*** 127.31 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.15) 
Maturity 62.83*** 56.16*** 87.04*** 36.35** 86.93*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
Log Maturity -180.57*** -181.06*** -196.93*** -132.56** -219.48*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Log Transaction Size -16.50** -29.47*** 32.43 -34.64*** 11.56 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.34) 
Loan Size to Deal Size -88.07*** -108.12*** 15.76 -132.41*** -8.54 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.78) (0.00) (0.83) 
Number of tranches -2.71 -1.61 -6.48 -1.32 -6.46 
 (0.24) (0.44) (0.24) (0.53) (0.17) 
Currency Risk -0.14 -4.36 76.36 -62.51*** 12.47 
 (0.99) (0.76) (0.19) (0.00) (0.51) 
Number of lenders -2.54*** -2.14** -5.37*** -1.36* -4.43*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) 
Fixed Rate 42.29 18.45 0 3.06 0 
 (0.14) (0.34) Omitted (0.89) Omitted 
Rated -118.00** -156.60*** -155.76 -145.41*** -17.63 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.27) (0.00) (0.90) 
Rated*Rating 8.66*** 11.36*** 13.17 10.92*** 1.58 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.88) 
Term Loan 57.60*** 73.87*** 11.38 102.09*** 16.95* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.09) 
Risk Free Rate -0.15** -0.16*** -0.28 -0.25*** -0.28* 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) (0.05) 
Country Risk 11.61 1.60 12.64  11.50 
 (0.19) (0.97) (0.22)  (0.28) 
Volatility 0.64 0.73 1.19 1.35** 1.23 
 (0.20) (0.16) (0.37) (0.02) (0.18) 
5yTB-3mTB -0.19* -0.18* -0.33 -0.31*** -0.19 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.24) (0.00) (0.45) 
Crisis 115.82*** 115.29*** 84.88 91.09*** 83.40 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.16) 
Common Law 5.35 -6.85 -50.88  16.51 
 (0.72) (0.72) (0.17)  (0.40) 
Market-Based 19.81    2.78 
 (0.26)    (0.90) 
Log total assets 4.42 6.31 -8.99 3.75 1.38 
 (0.42) (0.23) (0.52) (0.51) (0.86) 
Debt to total assets 17.51 1.79 22.05 -1.15 27.08 
 (0.23) (0.87) (0.55) (0.90) (0.36) 
Short-term debt to total debt -6.94 -10.22 -30.42 8.17 -22.40 
 (0.49) (0.41) (0.15) (0.51) (0.14) 
Fixed assets to total assets -56.74*** -46.51*** -172.97*** -31.84* -87.25*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) 
Market to book ratio -0.21 -0.28*** 0.80* -0.25*** -0.01 
 (0.18) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.97) 
Return on assets -7.68 -17.13** -96.80 -13.97* 10.81 
 (0.49) (0.04) (0.66) (0.06) (0.89) 
Fixed Effects      
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1290 1005 285 715 575 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.47 0.37 
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Note: Models [6], [6a], [6b], [6c], and [6d] are similar to models [3], [3a], [3b], [3c], and [3d], respectively, 
adding the logarithmic of maturity. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated 
coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered by deal. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. Control for fixed-effects variables region and industry. 
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8. Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the pricing determinants of loans in 
LBOs using a sample of 13,315 loans (2,671 deals) closed during the 2000-2013 
period. The literature review is focused on spreads and pricing processes and 
how they differ between market-based versus bank-based financial systems, 
common law versus civil law legal regimes, U.S. versus W.E. borrowers, and, 
finally, pre-crisis versus crisis periods. 
The main results seem to indicate that loans closed in market-based versus 
bank-based financial systems besides U.S. versus W.E. are priced in segmented 
loan markets. Loan spreads in LBOs are explained by contractual characteristics 
and macroeconomic factors. Concerning the contractual characteristics, the 
variables that have an impact are the deal size (log transaction size), loan size to 
deal size ratio, number of tranches and number of bank lenders per deal. 
Regarding the macroeconomic factors, the variables influencing spreads are the 
general level of interest rates, market volatility, the yield curve slope and the 
region where the firm is located. 
Furthermore, the current literature is also extended with the empirical study 
of creditor protection and financial market development on the influence of the 
relative cost of debt in LBOs. This effect is due to the 2007/2008 crisis and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. During the pre-crisis period, only 
LBO loans extended to market-based borrowers face a higher spread compared 
to bank-based countries. However, during the crisis-period simply borrowers 
extended to common law legal systems face a higher spread for loans in LBOs. 
In addition, comparing the regression results between LBO loans extended to 
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U.S. versus W.E. borrowers during the crisis period, it is verified that borrowers 
in the U.S. face higher spreads compared to borrowers located in W.E. 
The regression results presented for the term structure on spreads are different 
compared to Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Ivashina and Kovner (2011) and 
Colla et al. (2012). They discovered a linear positive relationship between spread 
and maturity. The results presented in this thesis document a robust convex 
relationship, which can be explained by some fundamental economics, such as 
liquidity or cash flow-risk and supply and demand effects. 
Lastly, firm characteristics such as book leverage have no effect on LBO loan 
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Loans extended to U.S. borrowers 
 
   
 Note: Graphs A and B are based on models [3]. Graphs C and D are based on model [3c]. Graphs A and C 
plots credit spread against maturity, it plots the prediction from a quadratic regression and adds the 
confidence interval on the basis of the standard error of forecast. Graphs B and D presents the augmented 
component-plus-residual and depicts the partial relationship between credit spread and maturity, once all 
other micro and macro factors have been controlled for. The straight line corresponds to the regression 
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